

Special Topics in Cryptography

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Last time

- How to combine CPA security + MACS:
- Security against active attacks
- CCA secure private-key encryption



Today

- Public-key encryption and key-agreement
- RSA (PKE) and Diffie Hellman (KA)


Public Key Encryption

- Secure communication even without shared secret keys!

Main challenge: starting from zero



Hope: We can communicate m "interactively"



Intuitive:

T: transcript.



C.S. 244
FALL 1974

Project 2 looks more reasonable, maybe because your description of Project 1 is huddled terribly. Talk to me about these today.
Ralph Merkle

Project Proposal


Topic: Establishing secure communications between separate secure sites over insecure communication lines.

Assumptions: No prior arrangements have been made between the two sites, and it is assumed that any information known at either site is known to the enemy. The sites, however, are now secure, and any new information will not be divulged.

Method 1: Guessing. Both sites guess at keywords. These guesses are one-way encrypted, and transmitted to the other site. If both sites should chance to guess at the same keyword, this fact will be discovered when the encrypted versions are compared, and this keyword will then be used to establish a communications link.

Discussion: No, I am not joking. If the keyword space is of size N , then the probability that both sites will guess at a common keyword rapidly approaches one after the number of guesses exceeds \sqrt{N} . Anyone listening in on the line must examine all N possibilities. In more concrete

<http://www.merkle.com/1974/>





Dear Ralph:

Enclosed is a referee report by an experienced cryptography expert on your manuscript "Secure Communications over Insecure Channels." On the basis of this report I am unable to publish the manuscript in its present form in the Communications of the ACM.

I also read the paper myself and was particularly bothered by the fact that there are no references to the literature. Has anyone else ever investigated this approach. If they consider it and reject it, why? Also, have you considered the fact that E may be willing to devote substantial resources to breaking the code? What makes you think an N^2 amount of effort is a deterrent, particularly since your solution allows E to set N code-breakers to work in parallel, each requiring N units to solve one of the puzzles?

I hope these comments and those of the referee will be of help to you in future work on the subject.

Thank you for submitting your manuscript for publication. Your interest is greatly appreciated.




Shamir

Rivest

Adleman

RSA

Defining Public Key Encryption



Private key

$$\text{Gen}(1^n) \rightarrow k \quad |k| = n$$

$$\text{Enc}(\boxed{K}, m, r) \rightarrow c \quad \rightarrow e_k$$

$$\text{Dec}(\boxed{K}, c, r') \rightarrow m' \quad \rightarrow dk$$

$$\forall K, m, r, r' : \boxed{m' = m}$$

randomized

Public

$$\text{Gen}(1^n) \rightarrow (e_k, dk)$$

$$\text{Enc}(e_k, m, r) \rightarrow c$$

$$\text{Dec}(dk, c, r') = m'$$



$$\forall (e_k, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$$

$$m, r, r' ;$$



$$m = m'$$

$$\text{Gen}(\vec{1}) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$$

Security of Public Key Encryption



A related problem: key agreement



Sec?
 Goal: if we use k to enc/dec
 using private-key
 schem:
 $C = \text{Enc}(m, k, r)$
 from A to Bob...

Completeness

$$K_A \stackrel{!}{=} K_B$$


\downarrow
 k

with prob

1

it remains
secure

Security of Key Agreement



Thm: if we use secure KA + CPA-secure-Secret-key Enc.
→ ABU Who knows. Trans + Ciphertext

Number Theory 101: Modular Computation

\mathbb{Z} closed under

- \mathbb{Z} : integers, can be added (+), subtracted (-) and multiplied (*)

$\{0, 1, \dots, N-1\}$

$x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$

$(x + y) \pmod N \in \mathbb{Z}_n$

- \mathbb{Z}_N : integers "mod N " : again we can do +, -, *

$\dots, 0, N, 2N, \dots$: same

$\underbrace{1-N, 1, N+1, 2N+1, \dots}_{\equiv 1 \pmod N}$

- Interesting cases for us:

$N = q$ for prime q

$N = p \cdot q$ for primes p, q

$N = 5 : \mathbb{Z}_5 = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4\}$

$\{2, 4, 8, 16\} = \{2, 4, 3, 1\}$

- g is a (multiplicative) generator if: $\{g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{N-1}\} = \{1, 2, \dots, N-1\}$

Thm if q is prime $\rightarrow \exists g$ mult-gen for \mathbb{Z}_q

$a = g^x$

Diffie Hellman Key Agreement


$\approx 2^{1024}$ sec param.
 (q, g)

g is generator for \mathbb{Z}_q
 q , prime

\bullet $\{1, \dots, q-1\} \ni x \in \mathbb{R}$

Alice

Bob



$b = g^y$
 $b^x = (g^y)^x = g^{xy}$

$a = g^x$
 $a^y = (g^x)^y = g^{xy}$

Fast exponentiation

$g^{xy} = k \in \{1, \dots, q-1\}$

$g^{xy} = k$

to get $g^y = b$

worse, first compute $g^y = \underbrace{g + g + \dots + g}_{y \text{ times}}$
 then take mod q

Security of Diffie Hellman: Hardness of Discrete Logarithm ...

If Discrete Log problem is solvable in
polynomial time \longrightarrow
we can break Diffie Hellman.
